Why we cannot afford to short-change our armed forces

British Royal Marines in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan is starting to receive the public attention it has for so long merited. The recent spate of front-line casualties among British troops, and the subsequent front-page images of grief-stricken relatives and flag-draped coffins, has finally brought the gravity of the conflict home to civilians and politicians alike. After years of prosecuting military campaigns “on a shoe string“, the MOD and the government are facing stern criticism for deficiencies in basic equipment and, above all, the availability of aerial transport. A cross party report published yesterday by the Commons defence committee, attributed the hampering of operations and increased danger faced by British troops to insufficient numbers of helicopters . The criticisms of the report however have come too late for the nearly 200 British soldiers who have lost their lives in Afghanistan.

The logical question many will now be asking is why did these deficiencies go apparently ignored for so long? Since the 2001 invasion by US/ UK forces, Afghanistan has been a slow burning conflict, one that was all too readily overshadowed by the war in Iraq and one that is now viewed as lacking clear or even attainable objectives. It has and continues to be however a costly campaign both for western military forces and for Afghan civilians. As of July this year there have been over 1,000 deaths among Coalition forces, with British casualties accounting for 184 of the total figure (By contrast there are no reliable records of civilian casualties, although some analysts have put the figure as high as 20,000.)

So where do these harsh home truths leave the British mission in Afghanistan? A recent Guardian poll suggested that opinion and support for the war was fairly evenly divided, a somewhat surprising revelation considering the huge levels of discontent generated by the Iraq war. Opinion is also divided among the “experts”; military analysts and politicians, who appear to base their views on personal experience as much as on political agendas and the lessons of history. Learned figures such as Rory Stewart  have painted a  bleak outlook as to what western governments can expect to achieve in Afghanistan.

Indeed, if we have learnt anything from Iraq it is that the seed of western democratic values cannot simply be planted by force and be expected to flourish within a few short years, a view boldly asserted by Stewart during a recent Newsnight special on Afghanistan. Does this mean however that Britain should simply withdraw its troops from Helmand and pull out of Afghanistan altogether? The short answer in my view is no.

Although I never supported the war in Iraq and was vehemently opposed to the 2003 invasion, I have always held the view that nations should finish what they start. When a country participates in invading and country and deposing the ruling regime, there is a moral duty to remain until enough stability exists in that country for it to stand on its own two feet. Sadly this means that military personnel and civilians will ultimately have to pay the price for the foreign policy decisions of political leaders. If this is to be the case the very least a government can do is provide its military with the equipment it requires to do its best in an unenviable yet important role.